Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber Space by Wang, Xu
UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY
Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Persistent




in Partial Fulfillment of the





I, Xu Wang declare that this thesis, is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Engineering and Information
Technology at the University of Technology Sydney. This thesis is wholly my own
work unless otherwise reference or acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all
information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis. I certify that
the work in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree nor has
it been submitted as a part of the requirements for other degree except as fully
acknowledged within the text. This thesis is the result of a research candidature
jointly delivered with Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications as part
of a Collaborative Doctoral Research Degree. This research is supported by the
Australian Government Research Training Program.
Signature:
Date: 07/01/2020
c©Copyright 2020 Xu Wang
Production Note:
Signature removed prior to publication.
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my parents.
This stands as a testimony for their endless support and love.
To my supervisors, for the academic guidance.
To my friends, for their encouragement.
Acknowledgements
I have to start by thanking my perfect parents Daofeng Wang and Peizhen Zhang.
They bring me to this fantastic world, support me to pursue research, allow me to
be myself. Many Thanks!
Throughout the doctoral program, I have received a great deal of support and
assistance. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Y. Jay Guo for
his invaluable support and immense knowledge. My deepest thanks also go to Prof.
Ren Ping Liu for all the opportunities he offered and his patience and help. I would
like to show my very profound gratitude to Dr. Wei Ni in CSIRO. My research
would have been impossible without his support and supervision. I would also like
to acknowledge Prof. Xinxin Niu and Associate Prof. Kangfeng Zheng in BUPT. I
would also like to thank everyone in GBDTC and UTS who helped me so much.
I must express my sincere thanks to my co-author, Xuan Zha, for the company
throughout the whole Ph.D. period from China to Australia. A very special grati-
tude goes out to my mates Bo Song, Guangsheng Yu, Shangjing Lin, Cheng Qin, Li
Duan, Shoulu Hou, Ping Yu, Yixun Hu, Yue Shi, Qingyang Liu, Qingyuan Kuang,
Heng Liu, Chao Jiang, and Yongjun Song. It is great having the awesome time with
you guys. I would like to thank the wonderful colleagues in UDT. I am also grateful





J-1. X. Wang, X. Zha, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng, “Game
Theoretic Suppression of Forged Messages in Online Social Networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 2019, (Chapter 3).
J-2. X. Wang, W. Ni, K. Zheng, R. P. Liu and X. Niu, “Virus Propagation Mod-
eling and Convergence Analysis in Large-scale Networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 10, pp. 2241-2254, Oct.
2016 (Chapter 4).
J-3. X. Wang, B. Song, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng, “Group-
based Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible Model in Large-Scale Directed Net-
works,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2019, Article ID 1657164,
2019 (Chapter 5).
J-4. X. Wang, G. Yu, X. Zha, W. Ni, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng, “Capacity of
Blockchain based Internet-of-Things: Testbed and Analysis,” Elseiver Internet
of Things, vol. 8, 100109, 2019.
J-5. B. Song, X. Wang, W. Ni, Y. Song, R. P. Liu, G. Jiang and Y. J. Guo, “Re-
liability Analysis of Large-Scale Adaptive Weighted Networks,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 15, pp. 651-665, 2020.
J-6. X. Wang, X. Zha, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng, “Survey
on Blockchain for Internet of Things,” Computer Communications, vol. 136,
pp. 10-29, 2019.
J-7. X. Zha, W. Ni, X. Wang, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng, “The
Impact of Link Duration on the Integrity of Distributed Mobile Networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 9, pp.
vi
2240-2255, Sept. 2018.
J-8. X. Zha, X. Wang, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng,
“Blockchain for IoT: The Tradeoff Between Consistency and Capacity,” Chi-
nese Journal on Internet of Things, vol.1, no.1, pp.21-33, 2017.
J-9. Y. Hu, K. Zheng, X. Wang and Y. Yang. “WORM-HUNTER: A Worm
Guard System using Software-defined Networking,” KSII Transactions on In-
ternet and Information Systems, 11, no. 1, 2017.
J-10. Y. Xu, C. Wu, K. Zheng, X. Wang, X. Niu, and T. Lu., “Computing Adaptive
Feature Weights with PSO to Improve Android Malware Detection,” Security
and Communication Networks, vol. 2017, Article ID 3284080, 14 pages, 2017.
Published Conference Papers
C-1. X. Wang, K. Zheng, X. Niu, B. Wu and C. Wu, “Detection of Command and
Control in Advanced Persistent Threat based on Independent Access,” IEEE
International Conference on Communications, 2016, pp. 1-6, (Chapter 6).
C-2. X. Wang, Y. Ping, G. Yu, W. Ni, R. P. Liu and Y. J. Guo, “A High-
Performance Hybrid Blockchain System for Traceable IoT Applications,” In-
ternational Conference on Network and System Security, Springer, Cham,
2019: 721-728.
C-3. X. Wang, X. Zha, G. Yu, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng,
“Attack and Defence of Ethereum Remote APIs,” IEEE Globecom Workshops,
2018.
C-4. G. Yu, X. Wang, X. Zha, J. A. Zhang and R. P. Liu, “An optimized round-
robin scheduling of speakers for peers-to-peers-based byzantine faulty toler-
ance,” IEEE Globecom Workshops, 2018.
C-5. X. Zha, X. Wang, W. Ni, R. P. Liu, Y. J. Guo, X. Niu and K. Zheng,
“Analytic model on data security in VANETs,” International Symposium on




P-1. R. P. Liu, X. Wang, G. Yu, J. Baird, “A Machine Type Communication
System or Device for Recording Supply Chain Information on a Distributed
Ledger in a Peer to Peer Network,” 2019901683, filed on 17 May 2019..
P-2. X. Wang, R. P. Liu, X. Zha, G. Yu, “Secure image capture and storage on
blockchain,” 2019903089, filed on 23 Aug 2019.
ABSTRACT
Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber Space
by
Xu Wang
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), a professional cyber threat as indicated by
its name, has become a type of significant risk in modern society. APT attackers
employ various advanced attack technologies to carry out attacks in multiple stages
over a long period of time. Due to its complexity, APT research is challenging and
incomplete. This thesis proposes a series of models to analyze key processes of APT,
i.e., social attack, propagation, and remote control. To be specific, game theoretic
models are proposed to describe social network attacks, and epidemic models based
on the susceptible-infected-susceptible process are developed to capture the propa-
gation process; machine learning methods are adopted to detect the remote control
traffic.
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows.
• This thesis proposes infinitely repeated games to capture the interactions be-
tween a message publisher and the administrator to suppress social attack mes-
sages. Critical conditions, under which the publisher can be disincentivized to
send any attack messages, are identified. Closed-form expressions are estab-
lished to give the maximum number of attack messages from an attacker in
the absence or presence of misclassification on genuine messages.
• This thesis proposes a new approach to model the propagation of APT across
non-trivial networks. A discrete-time absorbing Markov process of epidemic
model is first developed based on the adjacency matrix of the network. Asymp-
totically accurate bounds of the virus extinction rate are derived. We propose
a practical approach for the estimation of the extinction rate in large networks.
Our proposal has been proved theoretically and validated via simulations.
• This thesis proposes a group-based propagation model to analyze the prop-
agation process of APT in large-scale networks. The proposed model is ef-
ficient and accurate. The network nodes are divided into groups accord-
ing to their connectivity. A continuous-time Markov susceptible-infectious-
susceptible model is developed. The propagation threshold, under which the
propagation will eventually stop, is derived based on the spectral radius of the
collapsed adjacency matrix. Simulation results validate the model accuracy
and the analytical epidemic threshold.
• This thesis proposes a method of traffic feature analysis to detect the remote
control traffic of APT. Based on the independent access feature of APT net-
work traffic, concurrent domains in the domain name service are selected to
detect APT domains from domain name system records. The proposed traffic
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